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TEXT, TRADITION, AND REASON IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE:
AN INTRODUCTION
Adam Seligman*
Suzanne Last Stone**

PREFACE
In the fall of 2004, the Program in Jewish Law and
Interdisciplinary Studies of Cardozo School of Law organized an
international conference on the competing claims to authority of text,
tradition, and reason in both law and religion. The conference was
predicated on the view that legal and religious traditions share a
common interpretive structure and face common dilemmas over how to
integrate the often contradictory claims of foundational texts, historical
traditions of textual interpretation, and reason. Representatives of the
American constitutional tradition, the three major monotheistic
religions, and Confucianism took part. The interdisciplinary spirit of
the Symposium also was enhanced by the decision to invite scholars
working in a wide variety of fields, including law, religious studies,
anthropology, political theory, philosophy, history, theology, and
sociology. The participants came together for two days of lively
discussion and sometimes heated exchange. Despite the variety of
traditions represented, the papers related to one another in often
unexpected ways. Surprisingly, the debate exposed deep commonalities
of approach among those who work in the field of law and legal theory,
irrespective of the tradition they represented, with the sharpest divisions
emerging between scholars of a single tradition who work from within
different disciplines.
The published Symposium begins with introductory comments by
Professors Adam Seligman and Suzanne Last Stone, the conveners of
the conference. Session I follows, consisting of articles exploring
various theoretical problems emerging from the way tradition represents
* Professor of Religion, Boston University, and Research Associate at the Institute for the
Study of Economic Culture at Boston University.
* * Professor of Law and Director, Program in Jewish Law and Interdisciplinary Studies,
Benjamin N. Carodzo School of Law.
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itself. The topic of Session II is the political setting of interpretation.
Session III explores the way the idea of time enhances or challenges the
authority of certain texts or interpretive practices.
INTRODUCTION
The tension between a foundational text, the accumulated
traditional understandings of the text, and reason, is a familiar one to
students of constitutional law. Today’s Supreme Court is as divided
over the proper methodology of interpreting the Constitution as any in
the Court’s history. What justificatory role, if any, should be given to
the intent of the framers, the text of the Constitution, precedent and
political tradition, or moral and practical reasoning? How should the
Court order among these different modes of interpretation when they
are in tension with one another? These questions are not unique to
contemporary, secular, constitutionally organized societies. The tension
between text, tradition, and reason runs through all of the historical
civilizations and is attested to in the literature of all cultures. It is
especially evident in those religions organized around a revealed text,
taken to be the word of God. In those cases, the history of religious
thought is often a history of different understandings of the respective
roles of tradition and of reason in the social understanding of the
foundational text.
What is ultimately at stake in all of these debates is authority. The
different models of interpretation offer different modes of legitimating a
legal decision. Predicating the authority of a decision on tradition or on
reason has radically different implications for the organization of
society and for the legitimacy of rulers. Neither tradition nor reason
ever existed, of course, in its “pure” form (although such forms have
always had their defenders). Yet, the very juxtaposition of the one to
the other has been one of the most creative tensions in the history of the
human imagination.
In Judaism, for example, the authority of the plain meaning of the
revealed text (peshat), of received opinion (shemua or knowledge from
tradition), and of interpretive reasoning have all figured prominently in
the history of interpretation. The split between the Karaites and
rabbinic Judaism was a result of the Karaite claim that only the plain
meaning of the revealed text was authoritative. Indeed, within the
rabbinic interpretive tradition itself there was a tension between the
authority of received opinion and the role of dialogic reasoning in
understanding the meaning and import of a revealed injunction. Those
familiar with the Talmud can point to myriad of examples where a
debate over the legitimacy of various interpretive strategies, such as
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analogical reasoning (kal v’chomer) is interrupted by one of the
interlocutors, as follows: “Why are you arguing over this? I heard it
from . . . .” The statement makes a claim for the authority of received
opinion over that of dialogic reasoning in the understanding of the text,
a claim that was often contested. This tension became a central trope in
the corpus of the Jewish legal tradition. Today, the question whether
open-ended principles of justice, broad scriptural injunctions reflecting
moral, social, and religious aims, have weight in interpretive practice or
are capable of generating new legal norms within new political and
social contexts is a lively one.
Within Islam, entirely different schools of legal analysis developed
over precisely the issue of text versus reason, some stressing the
revealed text and others emphasizing the interpretive role of reason
(qiyas). From the Shafi’is and the origins of usul al-fiqh, through the
writings of Ibn Hanbal and later Hanbalites, to Muhammad ‘Abduh and
the more contemporary writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, to name just a
few, the role of reason in providing binding understandings of the
revealed word has been the source of much contestation. Much of the
contemporary struggle over reform in the Islamic world centers
precisely over the role of reason and the legitimacy of its use in
approaching, understanding and, ultimately, in the practical, social
embodiment of the Sunna of the Prophet and of the revealed text of the
Qur’an. Indeed, the neo-Hanafi criticism of the Islamic traditionalists in
the writings of such thinkers as Sayyid Ahmad Khan or Shibili Nu’mani
is precisely over the role of legal reasoning versus tradition in the
understanding of the hadith. This is a conflict, with much at stake,
which rages from the Indian sub-continent and Pakistan to Egypt and
Iran. Thus, one of the important and widely acclaimed books published
in 1989 in Egypt by Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali bears the title: The
Sunna of the Prophet: Between the Legalists and the Traditionalists.1
On the other hand, the interpretive hermeneutics of the Qur’anic
scholar, Nasr Abu-Zayd, led to his current exile in Holland. The Iranian
scholar Abdolkarim Soroush is one contemporary thinker who has done
much to try to bring about a new legitimacy to rational interpretation in
Islamic thought, weaving it with a unique appreciation of the work of
Rumi and the Sufi or mystical strains of the Islamic tradition.
Unfortunately, not enough is known in the West of Shiite jurisprudence,
which does not have the separation of legal schools that characterizes
Sunni Islam.
The interpretive history of Christianity is strikingly similar. The
Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century turned, in large part, on
the respective roles reserved for interpretation, reason, and hierarchical
1 MUHAMMAD AL-GHAZALI, AL-SUNNA AL-NABAWIYYA BAYN AHL AL-FIQH WA AHL ALHADITH (1989).
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authority in providing access to the divine word, pitting papal authority
against the plain meaning of the text and individual conscience as a
legitimate interpretive tool. Conflict between Catholics and Protestants
turned on the search for justification of infallible truth via a self-evident
criteria. The Protestants contested papal authority to interpret the word
of God, while the Catholics dismissed inner conscience as a legitimate
interpretive device. Thus, Francoise Veron, one of the masters of the
Counter-Reformation polemic, labored to show how the Protestant
claim that scripture was self-evidently clear was manifestly false.
Rather, it was in need of interpretation. But predicating interpretation
on individual conscience, he claimed, would open the flood-gates to
endless sectarianism and antinomian potentialities: that “search for
heaven and their lusts as well,” as one early seventeenth century
Congregationalist described his more enthusiastic neighbors.2 While
the struggles of the Reformation are over, the issues at stake are still
very much alive, often dividing mainline Protestant Churches from their
more evangelical brethren.
Even in systems lacking a revealed foundational text, such as
Confucian thought, there is a similar need to navigate between what are
understood as eternal principles of justice and the more circumscribed
abilities of human reason to apprehend them. None of the Confucian
classics claim divine origin, but all are the works of “sages” who best
understood the principles of an abstract tian (“heaven” or “nature”).
The duty of later commentators was to realize and adjust those
principles to their contemporary reality.
One could criticize
commentaries on a wide range of grounds, from stylistic inelegance to
the inauthenticity of the sources they used. Commentary that departed
too far from received ideas about eternal principles, however, was
dismissed as outside the classics (bujing) or simply uncultured (buwen).
A tension thus existed between claims of fixed knowledge of
fundamental principles, the need to adjust them to a changing world,
and the problem of textual openness.
As these few examples make clear, each tradition-including that of
secular modernity predicated on the Rights of Man and Citizen—must
deal with the relative weight and role of traditional authority, on the one
hand, and of reason and its interpretive tools, on the other, in its own
attempt to organize social life around foundational texts. If anything,
this problem has become greatly exacerbated in the modern world
where the justification for turning to tradition and the past is no longer
self-evident, and “reason” has become not simply part of the
interpretive process, but rather, an independent basis of authority. With
this development, which has defined the project of the Enlightenment
2 ADAM B. SELIGMAN,
TRANSCENDENCE 137 (2000).
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from the eighteenth century until today, the authority of tradition has
been either marginalized (in secular societies) or totalized (in the
“imagined” traditionalism of different fundamentalisms).
The
Enlightenment rejection of tradition and engagement with realms
inaccessible to reason has provoked a fundamentalist response, which
rejects the role of reason in the engagement with revealed and
traditional texts. The weaknesses of the first position were already
evident to those critics of the Enlightenment as J.G.A. Hamman; those
of the latter, are evident daily. One result has been the crisis in
authority that Max Weber projected, when the legal-rational order loses
all transcendent anchors. Another has been the increasing inability to
bridge the differing epistemological and hermeneutical universes of
tradition and reason. This conflict is increasingly perceived as a “clash
of civilizations,” when what is at stake is a conflict within all
civilizations.
The changing terms of political and social debate in modernity has
for the past two hundred years elided these issues, rather than solved
them. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, however, we have come
to realize that we have lost the fruitful tension between tradition and
reason that had animated traditional societies, at their best.
For the first time in centuries, a renewed engagement of the one
with the other may be possible. As the undisputed supremacy of reason
as source of social and moral authority has been called into question
over the course of the last century, and as religious traditions have been
forced to confront and negotiate within a rapidly-changing and now
global cultural milieu, new crises, but also a renewed willingness to
revisit this tension, are surfacing throughout the world. The revival of
neo-Confucian thought in China; the encounter between the Jewish
legal tradition and the authority of a secular state and civil society in
Israel; the return of Reform Judaism to new/old forms of ritual
engagement; the cyclically dangerous and thrilling experiment to
democratize Islamic Iran; the transformed position of the Roman
Catholic Church to the non-Catholic world following the Second
Vatican Council; constitutional debates over the teaching of creationism
in the public schools; and the role of evangelical Protestantism in
shaping contemporary politics in the United States are but a few
examples of the social implications of this re-emergent tension.
The organizers of this conference could think of no better way to
contribute to this nascent development than through the scholarly
process. This Symposium offers a reflective and comparative inquiry
into the theoretical sources of this change through a comparative
investigation of the way tradition and reason are negotiated in different
legal and religious traditions.
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I. TRADITION AND INNOVATION
The papers presented below are divided into three general
categories. The first category, “Tradition and Innovation,” provides a
theoretical overview of the tension between traditional authority and
innovation within Judaism, Islam, canon law, and Confucianism. In
both law and religion, in contrast to philosophy, deference to prior texts
or prior practices, such as a compact, a historical revelation, precedents,
or custom, supplies an acceptable reason for current decisions and
practices. Within religious legal traditions framed around the concept
of divine revelation, such deference may follow from ideas particular to
religion, such as the timeless force of divine command or the veneration
of generations closest to the initial revelation. Even within religious
traditions, however, deference to traditional authority is often the
product of ideas familiar to students of secular law, chief among them
consent. Thus, pursuant to Maimonides’ jurisprudence, the authority of
the Talmud follows from an agreement to canonize its legal decisions
and the authority of the earlier tannaite generations follows from an
agreement not to debate their decisions. Canonical texts and rulings
may be interpreted and reinterpreted but not rejected. A common
critique of such traditional forms of authority is that they subordinate
innovation to continuity. The essays in this section explore the extent to
which claims of traditional authority are understood within the tradition
itself as confining the capacity of later interpreters to innovate.
The most far-reaching claim for innovation within tradition is
advanced by Michael Puett in his overview of early Chinese
Confucianism.3 Puett focuses on the nature of practice, the relation of
current to past practice, and the critical question of how to innovate
from within a tradition of practice. In contrast to the Western emphasis
on pure will as the defining locus of change, of action, and,
consequently, of innovation, Confucianism emphasizes the very everpresent molding and remolding of tradition. Presenting what he terms, a
“ritual theory of innovation,” Puett shows how Confucian notions of
propriety allow for the continual refining of one’s own responses to the
constantly changing situation (of life) as defined by and contextualized
within ritual’s embrace.4 In an inherently fractured world (which is the
Confucian view of our own), where the center, as it were, never held,
there are only actions, human actions, to be guided by ritual
prescriptions. Thus, the goal of Chinese Confucianism is to build
continuity in a fragmented world by ritualizing useful actions that better

3 Michael Puett, Innovation as Ritualization: The Fractured Cosmology of Early China, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (2006).
4 Id. at 28.
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order the world. In this worldview, new rituals are not innovations;
rather, viewed retrospectively, they are exemplary actions that should be
followed. The Confucian ritual canon is an open canon: new, useful
rituals are continually added to the canon and useless ones discarded.
This is a deeply pragmatic vision of ritual and, indeed, Puett describes
Chinese Confucianism as an excellent illustration of what an antifoundationalist, pragmatic “tradition” would look like.
The very need for ritual regulation of a fractured universe of action
does, however, also evoke (with Laozi) the call for positing a ground or
foundation for the ordered act. Not surprisingly, this ground is to be
found in the sovereign or ruler who generates order as if it were a
natural process. Disguising actual innovation as the timeless, natural
order of things is a useful instrument of rule—for any sort of
sovereign—but its dangers, as Puett points out, are significant.
Interestingly, it is the very anti-foundationalism of the ritual tradition
that provides a critical corrective (at least potentially) to this tendency.
Hanina Ben-Menachem’s paper on The Second Canonization of the
Talmud puts forth a startlingly similar argument to that of Puett.5 Both
contend that what we term traditional authority is only authoritative in
retrospect. New sources of authority emerge within historical time and
yet are made to appear as if they are the timeless, natural order of
things. Ben-Menachem’s argument unfolds through a study of what he
terms the first and second canonizations of the Talmud. He begins by
noting that the Jewish legal tradition may be divided into three distinct
forms of law: Law, law to be applied, and concrete judicial rulings.
Law with a capital L, as Ben-Menachem puts it, consists of the transhistorical and context-free reflection on the Law of God. As Shlomo
Fischer later describes, such reflection on God’s law is a utopian
activity: to try to capture the law “as it exists in the mind of God.”6
This pure or theoretical law is not authoritative for practice. Only law
that has been translated by the sages into “law to be applied,” law that
can be applied in concrete factual settings is positive law and
authoritative for practice. Judicial rulings consist of the application of
the positive “law to be applied” to specific cases. The authority of the
later interpreter to classify a prior law as theoretical only rather than law
to be applied places considerable power in the hands of the later
interpreter to keep the law flexible and unfrozen. Ben-Menachem
focuses on the subsequent interpretive quandaries of classifying a

5 Hanina Ben-Menahem, The Second Canonization of the Talmud, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 37
(2006).
6 See generally Shlomo Fischer, Excursus: Concerning the Rulings of R. Ovadiah Yosef
Pertaining to the Thanksgiving Prayer, the Settlement of the Land of Israel, and Middle East
Peace, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (2006).
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particular law as either theoretical law or law-to-be applied.7 This
quandary marks the career of the Talmud.
According to Ben-Menachem, the Talmud initially contained all
three categories of law. In the medieval period, however, under the
influence of Rashbam, the Talmud came to be viewed, instead, as a
codification entirely of law to be applied and practical rulings. BenMenachem terms this medieval shift the second canonization of the
Talmud. It is only with this second canonization that the Talmud
actually became a repository of authoritative, positive law. Yet, the
second canonization portrays the Talmud as if it was authoritative
positive law to be applied from the very beginning. Thus, the authority
of the Talmud as positive law emerges only in retrospect. The
Rashbam’s vision of the Talmud is innovative; yet, over time, it appears
as the natural order of things. As with Confucianism, pragmatic
considerations are a driving force behind the instantiation of new
authoritative traditions. But whereas Confucianism is theoretically
committed to pragmatism, a driving force behind the second
canonization of the Talmud as authoritative law to be applied is the
contingency of historical circumstance. The historical vicissitudes of
Judaism shattered the oral tradition that the jurists possessed of how to
distinguish between theoretical law and law to be applied. It was, BenMenachem posits, the loss of this oral tradition that led, in the medieval
period, to the re-conception of the Talmud as a canonical text of
positive law to be applied, impeding innovation.
The critical distinction Ben-Menachem draws between theoretical
law and law to be applied brings into greater focus the commonalities
and difference among the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim legal
traditions. Although Ben-Menachem claims that the idea of nonpositive theoretical law is unique to Judaism, that claim is open to
question. Indeed, both Silvio Ferrari, in his discussion of canon law,8
and Asifa Quraishi, in her discussion of Islamic law,9 rely on the same
distinction. Ferrari argues that the capacity of canon law to change is
intimately linked to its juridical nature. Positive law is authoritative and
confining. But later interpreters arbitrate whether canon law is properly
seen as positive or theoretical law (law in potentia). Ferrari describes a

7 An example of this quandary would be how to categorize Maimonides’ famous Mishne
Torah. Often understood as a paradigmatic example of law-to-be-applied, any even cursory study
of the work will uncover its strong claims to be characterized as theoretical law (Maimonides’s
discussion of daily prayer is thus, not a simple how-to list of ritual acts, but a meditation on
divine love).
8 Silvio Ferrari, Adapting Divine Law to Change: The Experience of the Roman Catholic
Church (With Some Reference to Jewish and Islamic Law), 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2006).
9 Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of
Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 67
(2006).
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process within the canon law tradition that is the exact inverse of the
one Ben-Menachem discerns with respect to the Talmud. Whereas over
time, the Talmud was transformed from a corpus that included fluid
theoretical law into a repository of exclusively positive, authoritative
law to be applied, canon law was transformed over time from a set of
authoritative rules into a set of fluid and open-ended values and
directives. Thus, what was once perceived as a set of rules was later
seen to be values and directives. These values and directives require
additional human acts of positivization before they bear the juridical
character of authoritative rules. It is precisely the authority of later
human interpreters to control the process of positivization that provides
canon law with the capacity for change and adaptation.
Ferrari contrasts the differing juridical structures within Jewish and
Islamic law on the one hand, and Christian law, on the other, which
allow for adaptation and historical change. The first, Ferrari contends,
deals with change primarily through judicial interpretation, while the
Christian tradition does so through legislative acts. Rooted in the
“ideology of juridical completeness” and the “presence of a legislator
who is . . . super-ordained above the entire community,” the uniqueness
of canon law lies in its delegation of legislative authority to a single
ruler, the pope.10 The pope is charged with the process of transforming
divine law into positive law. Thus, the comprehensive code of law that
comprises canon law is not authoritative in itself; the law is
authoritative because it is promulgated by a singular authority: the pope.
By contrast, the Jewish legal tradition has no comparable legislator to
the pope. Instead, the task of institutional authority is to coordinate
among the various, legitimate sources of law and that institutional
authority is radically diffuse and dispersed. The Talmud is the last text
that is authoritative for all Israel. Post-talmudic rabbinic authority is
provisional and regional.
Hence, adaptation and innovation is
accomplished in the Jewish legal tradition through a decentralized and
pluralist system of interpretation, in contrast to the hierarchical and
monist system of canon law.
The contrast between the Jewish and canon law traditions may also
be re-framed in terms of their conceptions of the nature of divine law.
Thus, the difference between interpretation versus legislation as modes
of accommodating divine law to human history and so to historical
change has much to do with just how that divine law is initially
understood. While both Jewish and Christian civilizations understand
God as a legislator—a giver of commandments-their understanding of
divine law and of the relation of divine law to human history-and hence
to socio-historical change—is very different.
The Christian
10

Silvio Ferrari, supra note 8, at 61.
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understanding of divine law as a juridical act presupposes legislation as
the only means of acting upon the law and bringing it into some
conformity with the processes of human history. The Jewish, and to an
extent, Islamic, interpretive traditions are themselves rooted in an
original, non-juridical understanding of divine law. Legislative versus
interpretive modes of dealing with historical change also reflects
different attitudes toward the relationship between reason and truth.
Although, in comparison with modern and Enlightenment views, all the
religious traditions maintain a certain skepticism about the ability of
reason to produce truth, this skepticism has a radically different salience
in each of the religious traditions. Thus, we can posit two ideal-typical
positions: a) reason as producing truth and b) reason as an attempt to
explicate truth. The Jewish legal model, which privileges interpretation
as a means to bring the divine law into human history is nearer to
position b); whereas the legislative model of the canon law is nearer to
position a).
The distinction between theoretical law and law to be applied is
also crucial to Asifa Quraishi’s description of Islamic jurisprudence. As
Quraishi notes, cognizance of human fallibility is built in to Islamic
legal reasoning, as is “a pervasive skepticism in the ability of any
human process to achieve certainty.”11 While divine revelation
represents absolute Truth, any human knowing, interpretation or
application of that truth (law-as-applied) can only be partial and fallible.
Thus, the very same distinction that Ben-Menachem makes between
theoretical law (halakha) and law to be applied (halacha l’ma’aseh) is
repeated by Quraishi in the distinction between shari’a (Law of God)
and fiqh (the law of the jurists). Within Islamic juridical reasoning,
there were further, great debates between those who stressed the role of
reason (ahl-al-ray) and those who stressed the “plain” meaning of the
text (ahl-al-hadith). One of the critical points for comparative analysis
(with the Jewish case for example) would be in the institutional form
taken by these different strands of the tradition. In Islam, they
crystallized into separate schools of law—which remain separate to this
day; in the Jewish tradition, by contrast, the codification of the Talmud
as the authoritative legal code for all, subsumed the pre-existing
differences between different rabbinical schools, for whom such
distinctions were also relevant (Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai). Thus,
while Quraishi can trace the continuing conflicts between the advocates
of qiya (analogical reasoning) and those of illa (original intent)
throughout the different maddhab or legal schools, the same cannot be
done within the Jewish legal tradition where codification made of these
differences is nothing more than different individual interpretive moves
11

See generally Quraishi, supra note 9, at 82.
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rather than formal legal orientations, as noted in our opening remarks.
Another significant comparative point is the role of original
communal practice in defining later normative claims. As Quraishi
makes clear, at least one Islamic school of law, the Maliki, stressed the
role of early communal practice—of the Median community, as a tool
to interpret the Sunna, that is the practice of the Prophet (which was
taken as normative). The debate within Islam is, in part, over what is
canonical and hence authoritative. Quraishi poses this question starkly:
Is it the text of the Qur’an that Muhammad gave or is it all of
Muhammad’s output, including not only his statements but also his
practices? Furthermore, even if the text is singularly canonical and
Muhammad’s practices are not in themselves independent sources of
law, are the prophet’s practices evidence of the proper interpretation to
be given to ambiguous Qur’anic statements? This debate over what is
actually canonical has parallels within the Jewish legal tradition as well.
The famous story of the Oven of Akhnai, which pits the majority law of
the sages against a minority opinion which a divine voice attests as
correct, poses the question equally starkly: Is revelation, whenever it
appears, authoritative, or is the product of the initial revelation, the text,
authoritative? Similar questions surround the role of customary practice
in Jewish law. Are such practices an independent source of law or are
they evidence of the proper interpretation of ambiguous legal
principles? Thus, the Talmud records Hillel’s instruction to observe
what the people are doing in order to resolve a legal question related to
the paschal slaughter. Indeed, medieval jurists in Ashkenaz often
viewed the holy community of Ashkenaz as reliable carriers of the
tradition, whose practices attested to the true content of the law.
Nonetheless, this theme is more muted in the Jewish legal tradition,
possibly because the reliability of the chain of tradition and thus of
continuous practice was cast into doubt by historical disruptions.
Indeed, one important strand of halakhic theory locates the source of
scholarly disputes about the law in the disruption of the chain of
tradition with the destruction of the Temple and the Exile. It is
therefore primarily the task of the jurists to reconstruct the lost or
forgotten divine law.
This comparison raises an important question about the ways
history influences the continuing process of tradition and its
construction and reconstruction in every generation. Past practice, as
opposed to simply appeals to text and reason as interpretive
mechanisms, is a separate variable of significant weight. Traditional
practice may impede innovation more severely than either appeals to
texts or to reason. Take, for example, the famous rabbinic dictum that
everything a “talmid chacham” (meaning, interestingly enough, both a
great scholar and/or the student of a great scholar) can teach has already

12
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been given by Moses at Sinai. On the simplest level this statement
could be read as limiting innovation, for the statement implies that all
knowledge has already been given. Yet, this statement is also a great
legitimizer of innovation. The statement reduces the tension between
novel interpretations and tradition by claiming that any innovative
interpretive moves were always, already part of the tradition. It is an
open and interesting question whether such a fluid vision of tradition
would be possible if one of the pillars of tradition was original practice.
The essays in this section focused until now on the extent to which
rhetorical claims of traditional authority, nonetheless, make room for
actual innovation. Christine Hayes’s essay, Rabbinic Contestations of
Authority,12 reminds us that the tension between authority and
innovation may proceed in precisely the opposite direction: with radical
statements of authority to innovate accompanied by an actual retreat
from innovation. Hayes notes that many aggadic passages in the
Talmud, including the famous story of the Oven of Akhnai cited above,
proclaim a bold theory of rabbinic authority. And, indeed, early rabbis,
especially in Palestine in the first two centuries, enacted legislation
contrary to Torah law, engaged in creative forms of scriptural
interpretation, asserted the power to declare facts as a matter of law, and
relied on legal fictions. Yet, from the fourth century and on, while the
rhetoric of bold rabbinic authority persisted, rabbis, especially in
Babylonia, not only retreated from all four practices, they recast the
earlier bold exercises of authority as conservative or emergency uses of
authority.
For Hayes, it is unremarkable that later rabbis would express
anxiety over departing from the apparent thrust of Scripture, or adopting
erroneous or contrary-to-fact rulings, given a legal system that
represents itself as divine in origin—as emanating from a revealed text,
free of falsehood. Rather, Hayes argues, “it is the early and primarily
Palestinian tolerance for radical exercises of rabbinic authority that is
remarkable.”13 According to Hayes, the earlier Palestinian practice may
have been influenced by the surrounding Roman, secular legal culture,
which emphasized multiple sources of law and legal authority. But, as
the memory of Roman legal culture faded, as the center of rabbinic
authority moved to Babylonia, and as the Jewish legal system became
more clearly hierarchical—subordinated to the ultimate authority of the
divine text—the rabbis honored their predecessors work in word far
more than in deed.
The final paper in this section raises an important challenge to the
claim that authority and innovation are reconcilable within any legal
system. With great passion, Asma Barlas shows how Muslim religious
12
13

Christine Hayes, Rabbinic Contestations of Authority, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 123 (2006).
Id. at 138.
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scholars are continually able to move the discourse from text to tradition
to reason, when their anti-female interpretations of Islam are
challenged, without losing their power to frame the discourse itself.14 In
this way, they preserve their role as gate-keepers of religious meaning.
Focusing on the often misogynist positions of Muslim ulema and
exegetes, Barlas points to problems created for women by the continual
shift from arguments based on text to those based on tradition or reason
as legitimations for their own agendas and interests. Each legitimating
structure is capable of trumping the other; yet, the interpreters never
directly face the tension between text, tradition, and reason. Instead,
they use each, in different contexts, to resist change and to deflect any
critique of the patriarchal nature of religious knowledge as it is currently
structured. Indeed, the very multiplicity of authoritative bases only
serves to safeguard the discourse from any meaningful critique. Such,
Barlas claims, is the nature of authority. The relative roles of tradition,
text, and reason are, at the end of the day, always inherently political, as
is the interpretive process. This is the insight which Barlas would have
us assimilate into our readings of the inherent tensions between these
different principles. She ends by staking the claim for a new, more
liberating, reading of the Qur’an as a no less legitimate contribution to
the continual remaking of tradition.
II. POLITICS AND INTERPRETATION
Barlas’s focus on the political aspect of authority serves as a useful
bridge to the second category of this Symposium, Politics and
Interpretation. This category examines the relationship between
interpretive practices and political contexts. The doctrine of free will
was developed by Mutazalite philosophers within the context of a
struggle for the legitimation of political rule. Catholic and Reformation
debates over the role of reason in the interpretation of scripture were
also a political struggle over the boundaries and nature of the Christian
community. Different Jewish perceptions of the duties owed to nonJews and of the acceptable scope of Jewish-Gentile relations were set in
the context of political and economic dependency. The uneasy relation
of politics to constitutional interpretation was a major theme of slavery,
segregation, and abortion cases. Appreciating the role of politics in
constitutional interpretation and within religious traditions is of vital
import as interpretive traditions are compelled to respond to
increasingly complex political, ethical, and social agendas such as
14 Asma Barlas, Qur’anic Hermeneutics and Sexual Politics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 143
(2006).
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abortion, euthanasia, the importance of political sovereignty over sacred
spaces, and just war, to name but a few.
At the same time, textual interpretation cannot be reduced solely to
the external historical forces of a given era. It is equally structured by
the internal tension between reason and tradition within a given
interpretive tradition. The five papers in this category investigate how
the external influence of politics and the internal dynamics of an
interpretive tradition impact one another in different political contexts.
Two papers in this section concentrate on the changing role of women
in society. These are Yaakov Elman’s study of the changing legal status
of Zoroastrian women15 and Marion Katz’s study of how certain premodern Muslim scholars reinterpreted the practice of the Prophet in the
field of gender relations.16 The three papers that follow each deal with
the role of political sovereignty in shaping interpretation. These three
papers, by Arye Edrei,17 Shlomo Fischer,18 and Steven Fraade,19discuss
the effect of political sovereignty on exegetical innovation within the
Jewish tradition—though with three millennia separating their
respective cases.
Elman and Katz both address the changing status of women.
Elman’s case deals with demographic crises of the sixth century which
forced Sassanian civilization to accord women a public role that they
had not had before and to somehow legitimize that role through texts
that were by any account misogynist in their original or “plain
meaning.” Katz traces a very different movement with respect to
women’s public visibility as articulated by the Sha’afi scholar Ibn ajar
al-Haytam in the sixteenth century C.E. Elman is concerned with the
way the Zoroastrian tradition was reinterpreted to allow women to own
and manage large agricultural estates and to appear publicly while
menstruating; while Katz is concerned with showing how one jurist
argued against women’s appearance in the great mosque in Mecca
despite the clear acceptance of this practice by the Prophet. Both
illustrate well the hermeneutic principles noted above. The Sasanian
interpretive moves are simply those of analogical reasoning—which one
will find in Jewish, Islamic, and other legal traditions. Moreover, as
Elman notes, the Zoroastrian tradition seems as comfortable as the
Jewish with making those moves explicit (though perhaps not so much
15 Yaakov Elman, Scripture Versus Contemporary Needs: A Sasanian/Zoroastrian Example,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 153 (2006).
16 Marion Holmes Katz, The “Corruption of the Times” and the Mutability of the Shari’a, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 171 (2006).
17 Arye Edrei, Law, Interpretation, and Ideology: The Renewal of the Jewish Laws of War in
the State of Israel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 187 (2006).
18 Fischer, supra note 6.
19 Steven D. Fraade, Deuteronomy and Polity in the Early History of Jewish Interpretation,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 245 (2006).
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so that they are ensconced in the daily liturgy, as in the Jewish case).
The case of al-Haytam touches on the very point of practice that we just
discussed. His reasoning for an innovation (the limitation on women’s
public appearance) is predicated on the change in the current situation
of women (who, according to him, allow themselves a new
lasciviousness in dress and demeanor that did not exist in the Prophet’s
time). Note again the reference to past practice—but this time as a
model, fallen away from, the very declension then justifying new
practices.
New political forms provide no less of a challenge for interpretive
traditions than economic or social changes such as a demographic crises
or the putative change in women’s behavior. The emergence of
Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel is a remarkable
challenge for the Jewish legal tradition, forcing it to confront the most
pressing issues of realpolitik in the contemporary Middle East. Given
the development of the halakhic tradition in conditions of exile, the
Jewish legal system has few precedents to draw on in shaping a Jewish
legal response to the profound issues raised by political sovereignty.
Arye Edrei focuses on the different interpretive models halakhic
decisors have resorted to in confronting for the first time the need to
articulate a real, practical set of rulings on the use of force. As Edrei
makes clear, this became a critical issue when the State engaged in
military action that involved the death of innocent civilians (Kibya in
1954 and the siege of Beirut in 1982). The pivotal question halakhic
decisors faced is what significance to assign to the glaring gap within
the Jewish legal tradition on the subject of just war. The differing
positions staked out within the rabbinic community are shaped both by
different religious and political ideologies and also by differing attitudes
toward the jurisprudential meaning of a gap in the law. Extreme
traditionalists, Edrei shows, interpret this gap as a sign that the Jewish
legal tradition frowns on the use of force altogether. Thus, political
sovereignty, which requires force, is itself indicted by these
traditionalists. Classic traditionalists view Jewish political sovereignty
as simply another changed historical setting, which from the
jurisprudential viewpoint raises the familiar issue of adjusting law to
new historical situations and new political settings. They approach the
legal question in light of the conventional paradigms provided during
the exilic period for filling gaps within the Jewish legal system.
Pursuant to the conventional model, gaps within the halakha either
signify that the subject matter is outside the regulation of law
altogether—a matter of reshut or permission—or provide license for
incorporating foreign law, such as international rules for the conduct of
war.
Edrei identifies a new form of traditionalism that has emerged
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among those jurists who view the new political formation of the Jewish
State as itself vested with positive religious significance. For the new
traditionalists, the use of force must be addressed by the Jewish legal
system and that system must somehow craft rules drawn from
indigenous halakhic sources. To incorporate foreign law, instead, runs
counter to the religious nationalist ideology of resuscitating the halakha
as national law.
Edrei’s comparison of the rabbinic approach to that of the first
Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, is also telling. Not bound by
halakhic determination, Ben-Gurion was free to appeal to the Bible
rather than to the corpus of the Jewish legal tradition. His approach is
“Protestant” in that he proffers an individual—his own—reading of the
Bible to support the effort of nation building. This appeal to the
nonjuridical biblical source of the legal tradition to directly inform
political initiatives is a strong illustration of how a textual tradition can
be used ideologically by individuals who do not feel themselves bound
by the authority of tradition. The turn to revelation, unmediated and
unconstrained by its traditional interpretation, is analogous to many
contemporary “fundamentalists” within Islam and Christianity. The
rabbis were not free to the same degree and were forced to construct a
halakhic account of the rules of war—that is an account predicated on
the law-to-be-applied and not on the trans-historical word of God.
While Edrei focuses on the rules of war, Shlomo Fischer turns his
attention to the equally critical question of exchanging land for peace.
His paper highlights the legal methodology and religious-political
ideology of a contemporary Sephardic classical traditionalist, Rabbi
Ovadia Yosef, and contrasts his position with modern Ashkenazi
schools of thought, which Fischer terms utopian. For Fischer, both the
extreme traditionalists and the new traditionalists, which Edrei
identified, share a utopian orientation. The extreme traditionalists of the
Haredi community are devoted to Torah study as the exclusive form of
communion with God. The Haredi school wishes to recapture the transhistorical, objectively true divine law “as it exists in the mind of God.”
This is implicitly a rejection of the distinction Ben-Menachem drew
between Law and positive law to be applied. For this reason, the Haredi
community bases their rulings on the most severe interpretation, lest
actual practice fail to correspond to divine halakhic truth. Rabbi
Ovadiah’s devotion to the lenient ruling, by contrast, stresses that the
law to be applied must be realistic and capable of fulfillment by the
ordinary mass of the populace, given their frailties and constraints.
Such law is procedurally true rather than metaphysically true. Rabbi
Ovadiah’s orientation is also free from the nationalist utopianism of the
new traditionalists, such as Rabbi Shlomo Goren. While Goren’s
rulings are shaped by his utopian vision of the significance of the

2006]

INTRODUCTION

17

establishment of the State of Israel, Ovadiah Yosef insists on framing
the issues within conventional halakhic categories. In this respect,
Rabbi Ovadiah departs as well from assessing the establishment of the
State of Israel in nationalist terms, as do both the extreme and new
traditionalists. While the new traditionalists affirm the underlying
nationalist rationale for the State, vesting it with religious significance,
the Haredi school opposes a nationalist construction of Jewish identity,
of which the State is a realization. For Rabbi Ovadiah, the erection of
the State is simply a concrete act or event to be judged by ordinary
halakhic criteria. The disagreement among these schools over the
symbolic and material meaning of the Land of Israel, of the Jewish
State, and of the commandment to settle the land, offer another prime
example of how ideology informs legal methodology.
Steven Fraade’s paper, like that of Elman, reminds us that the
eruption of history is not solely a modern or early modern phenomenon.
For Fraade, the book of Deuteronomy is an exegetical exercise in
making a Constitution for the new polity of Israel—the polity of biblical
times. The focus of Deuteronomy is to create a new centralized system
of governance and, at the same time, to unify the new national polity
through law. This new Constitution appears, at first blush, to be in the
form of legislation—the laws set forth in Deuteronomy. Fraade shows,
however, that these laws are the product of exegetical interpretation—a
re-reading of the laws enshrined in the prior four biblical books.
Through this re-reading, the Deuteronomist introduces innovations that
would become normative within the Jewish tradition. Here is an
excellent illustration of Ferrari’s point on the interpretive nature of the
Jewish encounter with historical processes. It is fascinating that Fraade
bring this interpretive move into the very Pentateuch itself. Later
innovations and forms of community—textual communities if you
will—whether at Qumran or at Yavneh, were already prefigured in the
very innovations of the Deuteronomist—that is, in the divinely revealed
text itself!
III. TIME AND TRADITION
The third category of the Symposium, “Time and Tradition,”
moves us beyond the practical and historical and into the meta-legal and
broader metaphysical contexts or languages within which both text and
tradition find their home. Many of the papers in this section deal with a
substantive aspect of the human condition: love, sacrifice, or identity.
These papers are united in their focus, however, on the question of how
the way in which time is apprehended intersects with traditional
authority.
Within secular legal systems, authority serves to structure time
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along the model of religious traditions. Jurists look backward at the
sources of law, at precedent and prior practices, as clues to what is
possible in the future. Whether this new perspective on time ushered in
by the Enlightenment disqualifies legal arguments based on past
tradition is controversial. The legal sociologist Niklas Luhman has
argued, for instance, that modern legal systems can be guided only by
such principles as overlapping consensus, the future welfare of society,
or positive lawmaking—and not the backward glance of precedent. Are
there other justifications for turning to the past within modern legal
systems? Do some modern legal systems preserve a pre-modern,
religious conception of time? How does postmodernity affect ways of
apprehending time?
These questions are confronted directly by Paul Kahn,20 who
contrasts the differing ways time is apprehended in systems based on
liberalism and the social contract and in systems based on Christianity.
For liberalism, political time is perceived as progressing linearly. This
conception of time is captured in liberalism’s devotion to reform. The
goal of the legal system is to progress over time to an ever-better state
of affairs. Christianity perceives the polity as transtemporal. All
generations are united in faith in Christ. Interestingly, Kahn identifies
the American approach to political time not with liberalism, but, rather,
with Christianity. “We the People” is a metaphoric restatement of the
trans-temporal polity of Christianity. It is precisely this transtemporal
conception that accounts for the central place originalism occupies in
American constitutional interpretation. The dominance of originalism,
of searching for the intent of the framers, as the authoritative mode of
reading the constitutional text, Kahn argues, corresponds to the
conception of the American people as a transtemporal polity.
Originalism thus ensures that all successive generations will be united
and bound together in a common faithfulness to the text.
Continuing this line of inquiry, Ron Garet asks a deceptively
simple question: how do certain legal texts and readings within a legal
tradition gain more authority over time than others?21 He argues that
those texts in which law and personal sacrifice are inextricably linked,
carry heightened textual authority. As he begins, “there are principles
that are worth dying for.”22 But why does the fact of past sacrifice of
lives provide an additional reason to adhere to a legal principle, beyond
the worthiness of the principle on its own terms? Garet notes that the
very invocation of the word sacrifice to describe deaths in the course of
20 Paul W. Kahn, Political Time: Sovereignty and the Transtemporal Community, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 259 (2006).
21 Ronald R. Garet, “The Last Full Measure of Devotion:” Sacrifice and Textual Authority,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 277 (2006).
22 Id. at 277.
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this-worldly struggles not only situates such deaths within the
dimension of the sacred but implies that these deaths are somehow
addressed to the present audience, authorizing and directing those living
in the present to pursue a particular course of conduct. Such
communication is central to textual authority, Garet argues. This form
of textual authority is transparent in the case of Christian Scripture. But
the Reconstruction Amendments and the civil rights laws they launched
also exhibit this feature. They have a special authority borrowed from
the sacrifice of life in the Civil War. Nonetheless, Garet argues, the
nature of this heightened authority is radically different in the two
systems. Thus, Garet asks: how would the authority of scripture of the
Constitution change were we to discover that Christ’s sacrifice and the
deaths at Gettysburg had no historical veracity? Garet surmises that the
authority of Christian Scripture would be fundamentally negated
whereas the authority of the Constitution would be unaffected. These
two texts exhibit then contrasting models of authority. While the
Constitution sets forth principles and commands adherence to them in
each generation, whether or not prior generations sacrificed their lives
on behalf of its principles, Christian Scripture does not merely
command; it enables faith and love. But that enablement depends on
the veracity of Christ’s sacrifice.
The implicit subject of Jeremy Waldron’s contribution is being and
becoming.23 Waldron focuses on Paul’s critique of Mosaic law to
illuminate a central question in jurisprudence: what might law be or
become? We may view law as primarily aiming at identifying and
responding to transgressions or as primarily aiming at voluntary, full
compliance with its demands. The purpose that we ascribe to the law
fundamentally shapes the way in which laws are interpreted and, as we
see above, this purpose always has a temporal moment. Thus,
interpretation varies with the view of what sort of legal system is at
hand. Paul’s critique, Waldron argues, adds to our ways of viewing
systems of law. Paul directs our attention to the criteria law must
exhibit if it wishes to be viewed as promoting law-abidingness: the
requirements of the law must be reasonable and possible for ordinary
persons to fulfill. This is the gist of Paul’s antinomianism. He reveals a
defect in Mosaic law: it has features that are hard to comply with, given
what ordinary, reasonable people are like. This defect precludes
viewing the law as aimed at law-abidingness—its intermediate aim—
and consequently, precludes the law from becoming, from fulfilling its
ultimate future aim: salvation.
Waldron’s invocation of Paul also puts the question of law’s
audience at the fore. To whom are legal norms addressed? While
23 Jeremy Waldron, “Dead to the Law:” Paul’s Antinomianism, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 301
(2006).

20

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1

Waldron contrasts legal systems addressed primarily to citizens—
exhorting them to law-abidingness—with those addressed to officials
who apply sanctions for transgressions—another fruitful contrast
emerges from juxtaposing Waldron’s invocation of Paul with Fischer’s
discussion of the debate between Rabbi Ovadiah and the Haredi school
as well as Fraade’s invocation of the Deuteronomist. For Paul, the
addressee of Mosaic law is the ordinary individual, who is incapable of
perfectly fulfilling the law on his own. Hence, the law becomes a
stumbling block to salvation. Indeed, the gist of the interpretive battle
between Rabbi Ovadiah and the haredi community is over the proper
addressee of the law.
Thus, Rabbi Ovadiah eschews strict
interpretations that are beyond the capacity of ordinary people.
Fraade’s invocation of the Deuteronomist adds another dimension to
this question of the legal subject. Deuteronomy addresses the polity,
and not the individual. It is possible to fulfill the law, Deuteronomy
explicitly declares. But fulfillment is conceived in communal and not
individual terms, as is salvation. If we interpret “under a description,”
as Waldron asserts, that interpretation will have to encompass not only
the aim of the law but also to whom the law is addressed.
We have finally turned to the third “leg” of the collection’s title:
the role of reason and its place in mediating the tensions between the
dual claims of revealed text and interpretive tradition. This subject has
only been treated obliquely thus far and so a further word on the
position of reason in articulating both the text and the hermeneutic
traditions is called for. The comparative cases addressed in this
Symposium make clear how both reason and tradition can be appealed
to both as independent legal principles as well as a method of
adjudication. Reason, in the final analysis is not self-constituted.
Recall, Max Weber’s famous analysis of irrationality; as rationality in
the service of itself, rationality posited as a substantive end rather than
as a method. Reason of course, as method, is formal and universal in a
way that traditions—and texts—are not, which is the source of its
seductive appeal. In the search to provide an anchor for law these
qualities of reason present themselves as strong candidates; so strong
that we often are blinded to the fallible nature of reason when appealed
to not as a method to adjudicate truth but to produce it. The appeal to
tradition too, must however be understood as an appeal to tradition not
to provide an answer, but as an appeal to a certain form, a certain mode
of discourse and not as providing access to ultimate authority and
unmediated revelation. And it is perhaps at this point that we can
reflect on the importance of the questions posed in these papers to the
study of comparative law.
We begin with authority, a notoriously elusive concept. Yet,
several common themes about the nature of authority emerge from these
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comparative papers. A relevant theme that has emerged is the “a
posteriori” or retrospective character of authority. An authoritative,
canonical text is not self-executing; it does not constitute itself nor
appear already marked authoritative. Rather, authority is vested in prior
texts, practices, or traditions by its later interpreters and adherents. It is
in the nature of authority, however, that its retrospective character
remains hidden. As Puett puts it, it comes to appear as the natural order
of things. Third, appealing to authoritative texts or traditions is a way
of shaping a question, of finding a conceptual form, which allows for
communication diachronically across generations within a given
tradition. Since the text or practice is a vehicle for a conversation, such
appeals never completely settle the question.
Yet, law and religious practice also require the selection of a single
norm. The appeal to authority, conceived as a means of formulating a
question and initiating a cross-generational dialogue, cannot in itself,
provide a stable, singular norm. For this reason, law and religion must
have institutional structures that enable the selection of a particular
norm. Such institutional structures vary across traditions, as we have
seen. Their differences are sociologically significant. Thus, the
networks of rabbinic authority in the Jewish legal system and the
various legal schools of Islam provide a more pluralist institutional
structure than does the monist system of canon law, with its resort to the
pope.
This understanding of authority and its structures elucidates how a
particular norm comes into being, but not how it changes. How does
law change? Various answers have been given to this question in the
discipline of legal theory, ranging from the formalist model of internal
processes of law working themselves, pure to the notion that new
concepts enter into a legal system through different legal systems
coming into contact with one another. In this Symposium we have
stressed another theory of change, one that comes from the force of
history and contingency. Social and political forces intrude into a legal
tradition and impel a response. In the process, consensus coalesces
around the turn to new anchors or different methodologies to achieve a
satisfying result. New rituals are vested with authority, older texts take
on new authoritative status, or new interpretive strategies come to be
seen as acceptable methodologies within the tradition. How precisely
consensus operates and is achieved is a question we leave for another
Symposium.

